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Torts-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TRILOGY:-Commercial Carrier RE-
VISITED BUT NOT REFINED-Department of Transportation v.
Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982); Ingham v. Department of
Transp., 419 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1982); City of St. Petersburg v. Col-
lom, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982)
INTRODUCTION
The Florida Constitution provides in Article X, section 13, that
"[p]rovision may be made by general law for bringing suit against
the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating."
In 1973, the legislature elected to exercise this power by enacting a
statute waiving the sovereign immunity of the state, its agencies
and subdivisions from liability for tortious acts of their employees
or agents.1 This provision became codified as section 768.28, Flor-
ida Statutes.
Despite the seemingly broad waiver effected by section 768.28,
the Florida Supreme Court held in 1979 in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County2 that certain otherwise tortious ac-
tivities of governmental bodies could not provide the bases upon
which suit could be made. The court characterized those immune
activities as "discretionary" or "planning-level" functions under-
taken by the government. The activities for which liability would
lie were characterized as "operational-level" functions."
Since the Commercial Carrier decision in 1979, Florida courts
have wrestled extensively with the question of what activities re-
main actionable under section 768.28. The results have been con-
fusing and oftentimes conflicting, with few general rules of charac-
terization being uniformly applied among the five appellate
districts.4 Recognizing this conflict and confusion, the Florida Su-
preme Court once again entertained the issue of sovereign immu-
nity in three cases handed down simultaneously in September,
1982.' The court's decisions, made in an effort to "clarif[y] the ap-
plication of certain legal principles set forth in Commercial Car-
rier,"' substantially failed to achieve that much needed goal.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the "clarifications"
1. 1973 Fla. Laws 313, § 1.
2. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
3. Id. at 1022.
4. See infra section III.
5. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982); Ingham v. Department
of Transp., 419 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1982); City of St. Petersburg v. Coom, 419 So. 2d 1082
(Fla. 1982).
6. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1079.
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and changes wrought by the court's trilogy of opinions. This will be
accomplished through an analysis designed to provide the reader
not only with a working knowledge of the trilogy but also with a
basic understanding of the doctrinal, constitutional, statutory, and
decisional law which underlie the cases. An examination of the
strengths and weaknesses of the rules of the trilogy will be under-
taken, followed by some suggested modifications which hopefully
would clarify further the question of which negligent acts of the
sovereign are, or should be, actionable.
I. THE FOUNDATION
A. Doctrinal and Constitutional Basis of Sovereign Immunity
As early as 1888, the courts of Florida recognized that suits, ei-
ther at law or in equity, could not be maintained against the state
unless it has consented to be sued.' In 1930, Justice Brown, writing
for a unanimous supreme court in State ex rel. Davis v. Love,'
noted:
The legal doctrine that a sovereign state is immune from suit is
an ancient one. While it probably had its origin in the old theory
that sovereignty was inherent in the crown, and that the king
could do no wrong, and hence could not be sued ... this doctrine
was quite jealously preserved in this country .... It was, whether
wisely or not, deemed that certain practical considerations war-
ranted continued adherence to this ancient rule that a sovereign
state was immune from suit, even when brought by one of its own
citizens. Thus it had been said by many of our courts that incon-
venience and perhaps danger might result from its abrogation;
that the public service would be hindered and the public safety
endangered if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at
the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the
use and disposition of the means required for the proper adminis-
tration of the government.10
The same sentiment was echoed, though perhaps better sup-
ported, forty-nine years later in Commercial Carrier. Justice Sund-
berg, writing for the court, made clear that sovereign immunity as
7. For purposes of clarity, this examination will be limited to the area of negligence by
the sovereign and will not be concerned with instances of alleged intentional torts.
8. McWhorter v. Pensacola & Atl. R.R. Co., 5 So. 129 (Fla. 1888).
9. 126 So. 374 (Fla. 1930).
10. Id. at 377-78 (citations omitted).
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it exists today is "not predicated simply upon the premise that the
sovereign can do no wrong."" Rather, the doctrine rests firmly on
the constitutionally-mandated concept of separation of powers
found in Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. 2 The
concept of the separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive
powers of the state will not, Justice Sundberg noted, "permit the
substitution of the decision by a judge or jury for the decision of a
governmental body as to the reasonableness of planning activity
conducted by that body. ""Justice Sundberg's analysis of the con-
stitutional underpinnings of sovereign immunity provides a rea-
soned, theoretically valid explanation for the continued vitality of
the doctrine. The constitutional provision which mandates the sep-
aration of governmental powers, however, also provides that "[n]o
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers apper-
taining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein."'4 The mechanism by which suit against the sovereign is
made constitutionally permissible without violating the mandate of
article II, section 3, is found in article X, section 13 of the Florida
Constitution which provides that "[p]rovision may be made by
general law for bringing suit against the state. . . ." It is under
this authority that the legislature adopted section 768.28, Florida
Statutes, in 1973.15
Prior to this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the general
rule regarding suit against the state was clear. No suit could be
maintained against the state, its agencies, or the counties for dam-
ages resulting from negligence on the part of those governmental
entities or their employees who were acting within the scope of
their governmental duties.1 The only exception to this bar arose
when the allegedly negligent entity had chosen to exercise its stat-
utorily granted power to purchase liability insurance.' 7 In those
cases, immunity from liability for money damages was waived, but
11. 371 So. 2d at 1018 (analyzing two lines of case authority addressed by the Court of
Appeals of New York in Weiss v. Fote, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960)).
12. Id. at 1020 (suggesting that the court in Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
1970), recognized "a principle of law apart from the ancient doctrine of immunity as a sim-
ple aspect of sovereignty... [one] alluded to .. .in Weiss v. Fote ...which makes not
actionable in tort certain judgmental decisions of governmental authorities which are inher-
ent in the act of governing").
13. Id. at 1018.
14. FLA. CONSr. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
15. 1973 Fla. Laws 313, § 1.
16. See, e.g., State Rd. Dept. v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1941).
17. See Davis v. Watson, 318 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
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only to the extent of the policy limits.18
While the state and counties enjoyed virtually absolute immu-
nity, municipalities benefited from only partial protection. Immu-
nity for municipalities attached only when the allegedly tortious
activity was "governmental" in nature and when such tort was
committed against one with whom the municipality was not in
privity.1 9 For those activities deemed "proprietary" in nature, the
cities remained liable in tort.20 Although the supreme court at-
tempted to abrogate this distinction in City of Lakeland v. State,"
the principle was reinstated in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach2 2
and it remained in effect until the Commercial Carrier decision in
1979.
With the enactment of section 768.28 in 1973, the legislature ex-
ercised the power granted it by article X, section 13 of the Consti-
tution to alter radically the concept of sovereign immunity not
only for the state and the counties, but also for the state's
municipalities.2
B. Section 768.28 - The Statutory Waiver
Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1973, provides in
pertinent part:
768.28 Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery
limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations;
exclusions.
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state,
for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sover-
eign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent speci-
18. See id.
19. See Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
20. See id.
21. 197 So. 470 (Fla. 1940).
22. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
23. Note that § 768.28 was not the legislature's first attempt at waiving the sovereign
immunity of the state in tort. In 1967, the legislature enacted a statute whereby persons
sued by the state in tort could counterclaim in kind. 1967 Fla. Laws Ex. Sess. 2204, § 1(codi-
fled at FLA. STAT. § 768.14).
In 1969, the legislature enacted a statute similar to § 768.28. 1969 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 1-5.
The act was then repealed effective one year later. 1969 Fla. Laws 357, § 1.
Interestingly, the 1969 Tort Claims Act contained an express "discretionary function" ex-
ception. This fact was seemingly ignored by the supreme court in Commercial Carrier when
it held that "although section 768.28 evinces the intent of our legislature to waive sovereign
immunity on a broad basis, nevertheless, certain 'discretionary, governmental functions re-
main immune from tort liability." 371 So. 2d at 1022. See infra notes 128-34 and accompa-
nying text.
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fled in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agen-
cies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages
against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss
of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdi-
vision while acting within the scope of his office or employment
under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivi-
sion, if a private person, would be liable to the claimAnt in accor-
dance with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted sub-
ject to the limitations specified in this act.24
Characterized by commentators at the time as "a damaging blow
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity,' '9 5 the act nonetheless con-
tained some significant limitations. As enacted, the act limited the
liability of the state and its subdivisions (counties and municipali-
ties) to $50,000 per claimant and $100,000 per incident while
prohibiting the award of punitive damages.2 However, if the gov-
ernmental entity chose to carry liability insurance which provided
for coverage in excess of these amounts, then the liability limita-
tion was coextensive with that coverage.27 Although the liability
limits were raised in 1981 to $100,000 per claimant and $200,000
per incident,28 this remains a significant limitation on those seek-
ing redress from the state.
What was considered at the time to be a more important limita-
tion on the waiver effected by section 768.28 is found implicitly in
the wording of the statute.' The act provides for liability on the
part of the state "if a private person,. . . would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the general laws of this state. ... 0
By limiting governmental liability to instances where a private per-
son would be liable, the legislature effectively retained immunity
for legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial func-
tions of government since, under Florida common law, a private
individual could not be held liable for the exercise of these
functions.81
24. FL& STAT. § 768.28 (1981).
25. Kovolick, Torts, 30 U. Mtun L. Rzv. 357, 394 (1976). See also Ostrow and Lowe,
Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MiAum L. Rzy. 1297 (1979).
26. FIA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1974).
27. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(10) (1974).
28. 1981 Fla. Laws 317, § 1.
29. Kovolick, supra note 25, at 395.
30. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1981).
31. Allen v. Secor, 195 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Hough v. Amato, 260 So. 2d 537
(FI. 1st DCA 1972).
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Despite these limitations, section 768.28 was, under any reading,
a revolutionary law. For the first time, victims of torts committed
by the state, its agencies or subdivisions were presented with a real
opportunity for judicial redress of their injuries. It remained for
the Florida Supreme Court to define the parameters of this newly
established liability.
II. Commercial Carrier
Despite the seemingly broad waiver of sovereign immunity ef-
fected by the enactment of section 768.28 in 1973, the Florida Su-
preme Court nevertheless held six years later in Commercial Car-
rier Corp. v. Indian River County 2 that certain discretionary
functions of government may not be used as the bases for tort lia-
bility against the state and its subdivisions. The characterization
of a governmental function as either "discretionary", and hence
immune, or "operational," and hence actionable, has perplexed
lower courts throughout the state.
Commercial Carrier involved two decisions of the Third District
Court of Appeal which were consolidated on writ of certiorari to
the Florida Supreme Court.33 In Commercial Carrier Corp. v. In-
dian River County 4 , the county and the Florida Department of
Transportation (DOT) were named as third-party defendants in a
wrongful death action arising out of a traffic accident. Third-party
plaintiff Commercial Carrier and its liability insurer sought contri-
bution and indemnity from the county and DOT on the grounds
that the third-party defendants had failed in their duty to main-
tain a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred.
3 5
The trial court dismissed the third-party claim, and the dismissal
was affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal. 6 In the second
of the consolidated cases, Cheney v. Dade County,37 the county
was sued for alleged negligence in its failure to properly maintain a
traffic signal.38 Reviewing an order dismissing this claim with
prejudice, the Third District again affirmed, this time on the basis
of the "general duty/special duty" dichotomy: since the duty to
maintain the traffic signal was owed to the public at large, rather
32. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
33. Id. at 1012.
34. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), quashed, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
35. Id. at 1048.
36. Id.
37. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), quashed, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
38. Id. Again, this action took the form of a third-party complaint against the D.O.T.
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than to the particular plaintiff, no liability would lie. 9
On appeal to the Supreme Court, both decisions of the Third
District were quashed. 0 Justice Sundberg, writing for the majority,
rejected the concept borrowed from Modlin of "general duty/spe-
cial duty."'41 This done, the central issue remaining for the court
was the scope of waiver contemplated by section 768.28.
The respondent governmental agencies asserted that, in light of
the language fixing tort liability "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,'
'
there could be no waiver where a governmental function was in-
volved since private persons do not perform such a function. The
court pointed out, however, that a similar argument was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States4' when that Court was called upon to construe al-
most identical language in the Federal Torts Claims Act."
Despite rejecting both the Modlin doctrine and the "immune
governmental function" doctrine, the court was unwilling to abro-
gate sovereign immunity to the extent section 768.28 seemed to
imply.4 5 To this end, the court chose to read into section 768.28 a
broad "discretionary function" exception. 46  This decision was
based squarely on the constitutional mandate that "certain func-
39. See Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967). As Justice Sundberg
pointed out in Commercial Carrier, this theory effectively "results in a duty to none where
there is a duty to all." 371 So. 2d at 1015.
40. 371 So. 2d at 1023.
41. Id. at 1016.
42. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1974).
43. 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (failure to maintain a coastal lighthouse actionable despite being
an activity which private persons do not generally perform).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
45. Cf. 371 So. 2d at 1015 ("While we are not prepared to embrace the notion that all
acts or omissions by governmental authorities will subject them to liability in tort under the
statute, nevertheless we conclude that the district court has ascribed much too narrow a
field of operation to section 768.28.").
46. 371 So. 2d at 1020.
In response to the "discretionary function" exception argued by the governmental agen-
cies, petitioners pointed out that the Federal Tort Claims Act contained a similar express
provision. Implying that the Florida Legislature could have employed this language as well
(as they did in fact in the 1969 Act), the petitioners argued that no such exception could
now be read into the statute. The supreme court, however, noted that "[tihe absence of a
'discretionary exception' in [other states'] waiver statute[s] has not precluded several juris-
dictions from holding that certain areas of governmental conduct remain immune... "Id.
at 1017.
For discussion of federal court interpretation of the "discretionary function" exception
found in the FTCA, see Note, The Discretionary-Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 42 ALB. L. RKv. 721, 725-27 (1978).
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tions of coordinate branches of government may not be subjected
to scrutiny by judge or jury as to the wisdom of their
performance. 47
What, then, is a "discretionary function"? The court ostensibly
"eschew[ed]" the temptation "to fall back on semantic labels for
ease of application and seeming certainty, 4 8 recognizing that the
decision of what was "discretionary" or "planning-level" would re-
quire case-by-case analysis. It therefore adopted and commended
for use the preliminary test of a 1965 Washington case, Evangeli-
cal United Brethren Church v. State:50
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is
the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realiza-
tion or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or
decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission, or decision?"1
If these questions can be "clearly and unequivocally" answered
in the affirmative, then, concluded the Washington court, "the
challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree
of assurance, be classified as a discretionary governmental process
and nontortious, regardless of its unwisdom. ' ' 52 If, however, even
one of the questions suggests a negative reply, then "further in-
quiry may well become necessary, depending upon the facts and
circumstances involved."53 Applying these criteria to the claims at
issue in Commercial Carrier and Cheney, the court held that the
47. Id. at 1022.
48. Id. at 1020. The court borrowed the planning/operational distinction from Johnson
v. State, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). In Johnson, a foster parent brought an assault action
against the state for injuries arising out of an attack upon her by a youth placed in her
home. The California Supreme Court held that the failure of the youth's parole officer to
warn the foster parent of the potential danger was not a "discretionary" decision and was,
therefore, actionable under California's tort claims act.
49. 371 So. 2d at 1022.
50. 407 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1965).
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failure to maintain an existing traffic control device was an "opera-
tional level" function and, hence, was actionable. 4
As one commentator noted, "in the wake of Commercial Carrier,
courts construing section 768.28 must be able to identify policy de-
cisions: those decisions which involve a conscious balancing of risks
and advantages."5 5 This task of identifying "planning level"/"dis-
cretionary"/"policy" decisions has proven difficult for the lower
courts to whom the task was delegated. This difficulty and incon-
sistency prompted the court to revisit the Commercial Carrier doc-
trine in the 1982 trilogy.
III. PosT-Commercial Carrier CONFLICT AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION
Perhaps the most effective method for demonstrating the diffi-
culty encountered by the various district courts of appeal in at-
tempting to apply the Commercial Carrier doctrine is to examine
the holdings reviewed by the supreme court in the trilogy. Al-
though the cases were factually similar, the results were in direct
conflict.5 6
In Collom v. City of St. Petersburg,57 the plaintiff brought an
action for the wrongful death of his wife and daughter, alleging
that the defendant city had negligently designed, installed, and
maintained the sewer system into which the decedents were swept
and drowned.58 The circuit court granted summary judgment for
the city, finding that the design, installation, and maintenance de-
cisions were "planning-level" functions which remained immune
from suit.59 On appeal, the Second District reversed. Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Ott supported the court's decision with
the following reasoning: "[Ilmmunity of a government for negli-
gently performing an act no longer exists. . . .In other words...
once a government decides to act, whether out of obligation of (sic)
54. Id. at 1022.
55. Note, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 377, 381 (1980).
56. The supreme court's jurisdiction over the trilogy was founded on the conflicts juris-
diction of FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 3(b)(3). 419 So. 2d at 1073, 1082, 1083.
The Supreme Court found that the Second District's decisions in Collom, Mathews and
Neilson conflicted not only with the decision of the First District in Ingham, but also with a
number of other cases, including Romine v. Metropolitan Dade County, 401 So. 2d 882 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1982); Payne v. Palm Beach County, 395
So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Banta v. Rozier, 399 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
57. 400 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
58. Id. at 508.
59. Id.
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free choice, it must act responsibly and reasonably under the ex-
isting circumstances, and in accordance with acceptable standards
of care and common sense."60
Under this reasoning, the decision whether to take action to alle-
viate the drainage problem was deemed "discretionary.' 61 Simi-
larly, the determination of how to alleviate the problem was also
"discretionary."'62 However, "Jo]nce those truly discretionary deci-
sions were made ... [the city] could not negligently design, con-
struct or maintain a facility with impunity."63
Sixteen days after Collom was decided, the Second District again
was faced with the "discretionary" function determination in Neil-
son v. City of Tampa. 4 In Neilson, plaintiffs brought suit against
the city, Hillsborough County, and the Department of Transporta-
tion for injuries suffered in an intersection collision. The Neilsons
alleged that the three governmental entities negligently "designed,
maintained and constructed the intersection and failed to conform
with the State Uniform Traffic Control Ordinances and Regula-
tions. '6 5 The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Second
District reversed, citing its decision in Collom."
Twenty-two days after Neilson, the Second District reaffirmed
the Collom doctrine in Mathews v. City of St. Petersburg.67 The
Mathews plaintiff sought review of a circuit court order dismissing
her wrongful death action." The case arose when plaintiff's daugh-
ter suffered fatal injuries from a fall into an unfenced concrete
creek encasement.6 9 Again, the Second District reversed the lower
court on the basis of the Collom rationale: "While the city had the
discretion to decide whether to alter the natural state of Booker
Creek, once it decided to do so, the alterations had to be designed
and performed in a reasonable manner.''17
Contrast the reasoning in these three cases with that employed
by the First District in Ingham v. Department of Transporta-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 508-09.
63. Id. at 509.
64. 400 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
65. Id. at 800.
66. Id. It is interesting to note that both Collom and Neilson were unanimous decisions
of the Second District made by two panels with no common members.
67. 400 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 842 (citing Collom).
19831
712 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:702
tion." In Ingham, plaintiff alleged that the defendant state agency
was negligent in constructing, designing, signaling, and maintain-
ing a certain state road located in Hillsborough County.72 The cir-
cuit court dismissed the action against the Department, including
the allegation of negligent maintenance. 7 The First District af-
firmed on the basis of Commercial Carrier and Ferla v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County,7 4 a Third District case holding that the negli-
gent design and construction of a median strip was not a
"discretionary" function but that the setting of speed limits did
constitute such a function .7
Had the First District followed the "policy v. execution of pol-
icy" distinction of Collom, it seems clear that the decision of the
circuit court would have been reversed. By declining to adopt the
Collom rationale, however, the First District set the stage for the
supreme court's attempt at clarifying the doctrine of Commercial
Carrier.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Collom, Mathews,
Neilson, and Ingham were consolidated for oral argument.7 The
decisions which the majority asserts "have clarified the application
of certain legal principles set forth in Commercial Carrier'" are
summarized below.
Collom and Mathews
In Collom and Mathews, the Second District Court of Appeal
found that the negligent design of the city's water drainage system
was an "operational" function for which tort liability would lie.78
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, both decisions were con-
solidated for review, and the court affirmed the results reached by
the Second District.7 9
Despite affirming the results of the district court, Justice Over-
ton, writing for a four-member majority, rejected the broad lan-
71. 399 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
72. Id. at 1029.
73. Id. Although this is unclear from the order entered by the circuit court, the allega-
tion of negligent maintenance was dismissed along with the other allegations. This seems on
its face to directly conflict with the holding in Commercial Carrier. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
74. 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
75. Id. at 66-67.
76. Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1083.
77. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1079.
78. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
79. 419 So. 2d 1082, 1087.
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guage of governmental liability enunciated by the lower court in
Collom, and followed in Mathews, "because this language implies
governmental liability for defects inherent in plans for improve-
ments as approved by governmental entities."80 Overton based the
rejection of this theory of liability directly on the concept of sepa-
ration of power, finding that adoption of "the district court's rea-
soning would permit the judicial branch to substantially interfere
with the functioning of the legislative and executive branches of
government." '81
Rather than relying on the broad language of the district court
opinions in Collom and Mathews, the supreme court based its af-
firmance on the principle that "when a governmental entity creates
a known dangerous condition, which is not readily apparent to per-
sons who could be injured by the condition, a duty at the opera-
tional-level arises to warn the public of, or protect the public from,
the known danger. '82
When comparison is made, the difference between the treatment
of Collom and Mathews by the Second District and that afforded
by the supreme court is clear. Whereas the Second District main-
tained that the governmental entity would be liable for a breach of
the duty to "act responsibly and reasonably under the existing cir-
cumstances,""s the supreme court held that liability would lie only
if the entity failed to warn the public of this breach, and only then
if the breach was known to the governmental entity.
Neilson
In Neilson, the supreme court quashed the decision of the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal holding that the failure to adequately
design or signalize a multi-street intersection was an "operational-
level" function of government." Again, Justice Overton wrote for a
four-member majority which held that "such activities are basic
capital improvements and are judgmental, planning-level
functions."8 5
Despite once again rejecting the broad language of the Second
District, Justice Overton was quick both to limit the scope of the
Neilson rule and to borrow from the rationale of his opinion in
80. Id. at 1085.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1083 (emphasis in original).
83. 400. So. 2d at 508.
84. 419 So. 2d 1071, 1073.
85. Id. at 1077.
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Collom:
This is not to say, however, that a governmental entity may not
be liable for an engineering design defect not inherent in the
overall plan for a project it has directed to be built, or for an
inherent defect which creates a known dangerous condition. To
illustrate a situation in which liability may arise in the former
instance, a highway could be constructed with a bridge spanning
a waterway. If the bridge supports are negligently designed and
give way, causing injury, an action could be maintained because
there is an engineering design defect not inherent in the overall
plan approved by the governmental entity. If, however, the al-
leged defect is one that results from the overall plan itself, it is
not actionable unless a known dangerous condition is
established.8 6
The court provided several illustrations of inherent defects: "the
construction of a two-lane highway where traffic use indicates four-
laning is necessary," and "the construction of a curved road where
a straight road would be more appropriate. ' 87 It concluded that
"[s]uch decisions as the location and alignment of roads, the width
and number of lanes, and the placing of traffic control devices are
not actionable because the defects are inherent in the overall pro-
ject itself. 88
The Neilson decision, like the one in Collom, was ostensibly
based directly on the concept of separation of power. Quoting from
the Washington Supreme Court decision in Evangelical United
Brethren Church, a case earlier relied upon in Commercial Car-
rier, Justice Overton observed:
Liability cannot be imposed when condemnation of the acts or
omissions relied upon necessarily brings into question the propri-
ety of governmental objectives or programs or the decision of one
who, with the authority to do so, determined that the acts or
omissions involved should occur or that the risk which eventuated
should be encountered for the advancement of governmental
objectives.8
86. Id. at 1077-78.
87. Id. at 1078.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1075 (quote originally taken from Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 31
WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956)).
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Ingham
Basing its decision on Neilson, the same four-member majority
which decided Collom and Neilson affirmed the decision of the
First District Court of Appeal in Ingham v. Department of Trans-
portation.90 In a very brief opinion, the court simply held that "al-
leged negligence of a governmental entity in constructing a road
with a curve, in determining the position, shape and size of a me-
dian, and in failing to provide adequate traffic signals" implicates
"defects inherent in the overall plan of the road."'91 Thus, under
Neilson, this negligence arose at the "judgmental, planning-level"
with absolute immunity attaching to these activities.2
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULES OF THE TRILOGY
Although the determination of what constitutes actionable negli-
gence under section 768.28 is concededly a difficult one, the court's
opinions in the 1982 trilogy do little to clarify this issue. As Justice
Sundberg points out in his dissent in Neilson, "the majority has
simply exchanged one set of result-descriptive labels for another.
Hence, the irreconcilable results among the several district courts
of appeal are not harmonized, but rather the confusion is com-
pounded. The enigma is now shrouded in mystery."' 3
Without suggesting that the individual preconceptions of the
seven members of the court should, or indeed do, influence the
court's decisions, it is helpful to compare the stances taken by the
members of the court in the trilogy. Justice Sundberg, author of
the guidepost decision in Commercial Carrier, dissents from each
of the trilogy opinions. Justice Adkins, who concurred in the ma-
jority opinion in Commercial Carrier, joins Justice Sundberg in
dissent. Conversely, each of the trilogy opinions is authored by
Justice Overton who, joined by Justice Boyd, dissented in Com-
mercial Carrier."
Despite the apparent inconsistency resulting when the author of
the Commercial Carrier doctrine dissents from a subsequent at-
tempt to "clarify" it, certain rules are discernible from the more
90. 419 So. 2d 1081, 1082.
91. Id. at 1082.
92. Id.
93. 419 So. 2d at 1079 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
94. 371 So. 2d at 1023 (Overton, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Alderman, the only re-
maining member of the Commercial Carrier court, originally joined Justice Sundberg in
that opinion. However, in the trilogy, the two part ways, with Chief Justice Alderman join-
ing Justice Overton's majority opinion.
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recent opinions:
1. Defects which are inherent in the overall plan of a capital im-
provement project are not actionable under section 768.28;95
2. However, defects not inherent in the overall plan of such a
project are actionable;9 6
3. Additionally, regardless of whether the defect is inherent in
the overall plan, if it creates a danger known to the governmental
entity, an actionable duty arises to warn of or protect from the
danger.9 7
Although these rules can be siply stated, problems arise, as Jus-
tice Sundberg intimates, in both their application and
justification.98
Justice Sundberg's dissatisfaction with the majoritys exchange of
"one set of result descriptive labels for another" 99 is well-founded.
The avowed intent of the court in Commercial Carrier was to
avoid the pigeonholing of various functions of government into
"actionable" and "non-actionable" classes."' 0 Despite this intent,
the lower courts continued to base decisions on the class of activity
engaged in rather than on the level of policy decision made.101 The
majority opinion serves only to change the focus from the type of
activity engaged in to the type of defect which inhered in that
activity.
It is imperative to note that the Commercial Carrier doctrine
applies only to certain "discretionary" governmental functions.
The inquiry mandated by Commercial Carrier is, therefore, only in
part whether the function is "discretionary." However, all too
often, the courts base their decisions solely upon this determina-
tion without inquiring into whether the function is one of the "cer-
tain" few which merit sovereign immunity despite the waiver ef-
fected by section 768.28. As Justice Sundberg points out in his
dissent in Neilson, "a finding of immunity is the exception rather
than the rule."102 Further, because Commercial Carrier dealt only
with certain discretionary functions, "[tlhe judicial gloss supplied
by [the] Court should be narrowly rather than expansively in-
95. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1077.
96. Id.
97. Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1083.
98. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1079 (Sundber, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. 371 So. 2d at 1021.
101. Witness the cases cited by Justice Overton to support his conclusion that the activ-
ity of placing traffic signals is "discretionary." 419 So. 2d at 1076.
102. 419 So. 2d at 1079 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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voked.' 0 3 Implicit in this statement is that the "inherent in the
overall plan'1 4 test is not only too vague, it is overinclusive.
In Commercial Carrier, the court adopted the analysis of John-
son v. State,0 5 a 1968 California case which sought to identify the
means for isolating those "certain" discretionary functions which
constitutionally require immunity from liability.'06 As Justice
Sundberg points out in Neilson:
That analysis is not a mechanistic one, but rather looks to the
reasons for granting immunity to the governmental entity. It re-
quires the Court 'to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legisla-
tive policymaking which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blan-
ket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that
careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision.' "107
As Justice Sundberg indicates, the application of the Johnson cri-
teria by other jurisdictions has consistently resulted in holdings
that dangerous conditions created by a governmental entity in the
design of a highway, whether known to the entity or not, will give
rise to tort liability.10 8 In one such case, the Oregon Supreme Court
noted that "[tihese decisions involve the use of 'discretion' in the
sense that a choice must be made but they do not involve the use
of 'discretion' in the sense that a policy decision is required."' 09
Further, another court confronted with the problem held that
"[elven though the decision to resurface may have involved policy,
after that decision failure to safely execute the plan was an opera-
tional deficiency."'"10
Aside from requiring that the challenged governmental act or
omission be one in the nature of basic policy formulation, Justice
Sundberg also advocates the requirement that the governmental
entity "demonstrate that a 'considered' decision was under-
taken.""' This requirement, borrowed from Johnson v. State"'
103. Id.
104. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1077; Ingham, 419 So. 2d at 1082; Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1085.
105. 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
106. 371 So. 2d at 1021.
107. 419 So. 2d at 1079-80 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
108. Id. (citing Stevenson v. State Dep't. of Transp., 619 P.2d 247 (Or. 1980); State v.
I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1974); Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1980); Carroll v.
State Rd. Comm'n, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972); Baldwin v. State, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1972).
109. Stevenson, 619 P.2d at 252.




718 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:702
and previously applied by the First District in Bellavance v.
State," ' mandates that the challenged decision be one which con-
sciously balances the risks and advantages of the various
alternatives."'
As Justice Sundberg notes in his dissent, there was no showing
by the city in Neilson of any such balancing.115 Neilson alleged in
his complaint that the condition of the subject intersection was
dangerous and hazardous at the time of the accident and was
known or should have been known by the governmental entities to
be so. "' Assuming for purposes of the motion to dismiss that these
allegations are true, it could not be asserted seriously that the city
made a "considered" decision to keep it that way.117 Further, this
assumed knowledge would impose the actionable duty to warn rec-
ognized by the court in Collom. 1' 8
Although Justice Sundberg takes issue with both the analysis
and the result reached by the majority, he stops short of deciding
whether defective highway design without notice of the defect will
give rise to liability. " 9 This decision is consistent with his position
in Commercial Carrier,20 but, like the majority opinions, fails to
clarify what should be a central issue.
An issue not raised by the dissent, but one which is perhaps
more troubling than those expressly dealt with therein is the
court's treatment of the claim in Neilson that the governmental
entities failed to comply with the design, construction, and mainte-
nance standards established by sections 335.075 and 316.131, Flor-
ida Statutes. Those statutes provide for the adoption of uniform
regulations regarding traffic signals and devices,' 21 as well as mini-
mum standards for the design, construction, and maintenance of
streets, roads, highways, and bridges. 22 Justice Overton, writing
for the court, dismisses the contention that the failure to comply
with these standards will give rise to an "operational" failure by
pointing out that these statutory provisions are directory rather
112. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
113. 390 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981).
114. 390 So. 2d at 425.
115. 419 So. 2d at 1081 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1081 n.3.
117. Id. at 1081.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1081 n.4.
120. 371 So. 2d at 1022-23.
121. FLA. STAT. § 316.131 (1975).
122. FLA. STAT. § 335.075 (1975).
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than mandatory.' 3
Although it is true that the statute relating to road design, con-
struction, and maintenance does not by its terms impose a duty to
comply, the statute establishing standards for uniform traffic con-
trol devices provides that "[aill official traffic control . . . devices
. . . shall conform with the manual and specifications published by
the department of transportation pursuant to [this statute].""'2 It
seems difficult to imagine how the alleged breach of a statutorily-
imposed duty' 6 could be a "discretionary" function. At the very
least, this allegation raises a question of fact which was not suita-
ble for determination on the motion to dismiss affirmed by the
high court.
CONCLUSION
As the challenges mounted by Justice Sundberg in dissent indi-
cate, the rules enunciated by the majority in the 1982 trilogy fall
far short of their goal of "clarifying" the doctrine of Commercial
Carrier. The basic difficulties with these decisions lie in two areas.
First, they fail to adequately instruct the lower courts regarding
which activities are actionable. The court merely added to the ad-
mittedly amorphous "planning level/operational level" distinction
the equally unclear "inherent defect" standard.
Secondly, and more importantly, the court has apparently
treated the exception as the rule and the rule as the exception. As
the California Supreme Court said in Johnson, "[Wihen there is
negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception."' 6 As
the legislative enactment of section 768.28 makes clear, the waiver
of tort immunity was intended to be broad. The exceptions read
into that statute by the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial
Carrier should be construed, as Justice Sundberg recognizes, as
narrow, limited ones.12 7
The contention that the legislature intended any implicit statu-
tory exceptions to be narrowly construed is well supported by the
history of the legislative attempts to waive sovereign immunity of
the state in tort. Whereas the 1969 waiver contained an explicit
123. 419 So. 2d at 1078.
124. FLA. STAT. § 316.131(3)(1975) (emphasis added).
125. Neilson specifically alleged a failure to provide adequate traffic control devices. 419
So. 2d at 1074.
126. 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 251 (1968) (quoting Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 94 (1961)).
127. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1079 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
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exception for "discretionary functions, ' 28 the 1973 enactment con-
strued by the high court in Commercial Carrier contained no such
explicit exception. 29 Insofar as any statute purporting to waive
sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal,3 0 this absence
would seem to indicate that the legislature consciously intended
that no such exception be applied.''
Of course, it can be argued that legislative inaction since Com-
mercial Carrier indicates an acquiescence in that holding. 3 2 How-
ever, it does not represent acquiescence in any subsequent broad-
ening of the exception enunciated in that case. Furthermore, the
acceptance of the Commercial Carrier exception for "certain dis-
cretionary functions" does not confer upon the court authority to
disregard the limited nature of the exception. Such a course of ac-
tion not only flies in the face of well-established case law, 33 but
also arguably entails constitutionally impermissible judicial ac-
tion. 3 4 Certainly some form of a "discretionary function" excep-
tion is necessary in order to shield the state from liability for basic
policy decisions. The question then becomes the point at which the
line should be drawn between immune and actionable governmen-
tal conduct. In an effort to better balance the state's interest in
protecting its basic policy decisions with the public's interest in
securing an available means for redress of their injuries, the follow-
ing general principles are proffered:
First, the courts should, in making this determination, presume
128. 1969 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(1).
129. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1981).
130. See, e.g., Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958). See
also State v. Gordon Bros. Concrete, 339 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
131. Cf. Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1979) (when the legislature in
amending a statute omits words appearing in the previous version, a presumption attaches
that the legislature intended that the statute convey a different meaning).
132. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 91 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1956).
133. See, e.g., Spangler, supra, note 130, wherein the court stated that the required
waiver of immunity "will not be reached as a product of inference or implication .. " Id.
at 424. See also Manatee County v. Town of LongBoat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978). In
LongBoat Key, decided one year prior to Commercial Carrier, the Florida Supreme Court
held that the Constitution "requires specfiic, clear, and unambiguous language in a statute
to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at 147.
134. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 provides that "[plrovision may be made by general law for
bringing suit against the state .... " (emphasis added). Insofar as the power to enact gen-
eral law lies solely with the legislature, attempts by the judiciary to redefine the legislative
intention may raise some interesting constitutional questions. For example, although the
constitutional provision makes clear that the courts are not empowered to waive sovereign
immunity, does the provision conversely limit the courts authority to restrict a right granted
by the legislature pursuant to the provision?
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that the challenged activity does come within the coverage of sec-
tion 768.28 and, consequently, is actionable.' 88
Secondly, for the activity to come within the narrow exception
introduced by the court in Commercial Carrier, the governmental
entity must convincingly demonstrate that the activity is directly
related to a basic policy decision by a coordinate branch of
government. 3 '
Third, failure of the governmental entity to conform with stat-
utorily-mandated standards of conduct will result in a determina-
tion that liability lies for that failure. s7
Fourth, no immunity should lie for failure in the implementa-
tion of a policy-level decision. 8
Finally, should an activity of the government entity result in a
condition which the entity knows or should know to be hazardous
to the public, an actionable duty arises to warn of or protect from
that danger.'
In summary, the exception engrafted onto section 768.28 by the
Commercial Carrier decision is a needed and justifiable one. How-
ever, abuse and overuse of the exception creates more problems
than are rectified by its proper application. Consequently, the su-
preme court must strive to adopt guidelines which will insure that
the "discretionary function" exception of Commercial Carrier is
applied only in those circumstances in which the practical and con-
stitutional concerns underlying the exception warrant such appli-
cation."10 Such an approach necessarily prohibits the use of mech-
anistic rules and tests such as those advocated by the majority in
the trilogy. The court must recognize that aside from providing for
the separation of governmental power, the Florida Constitution
also provides the people with a right of free and unfettered access
135. See, e.g., Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1079, which states, "a finding of immunity is the
exception rather than the rule".
136. See, e.g., 371 So. 2d at 1021.
137. See, e.g., Neilson, 400 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). For a well-reasoned applica-
tion of this principle, see City of Jacksonville v. DeRay, 418 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982). In that case, the First District held that insofar as the city failed to comply with
mandatory provisions of the manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices which the city had
adopted, liability would lie.
138. Id. See also Mathews, 400 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); supra notes 106-108 and
accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1083.
140 For a similar argument made in the context of the FTCA, see Comment, Federal
Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REv.
170, 190-97 (1976).
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to the courts. " 1 As the law presently stands, the court is protecting
the former at the expense of the latter.
KENNETH MCLAUGHLIN
141. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
